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Source of the Great Recession
Ryo Hasumi, Hirokuni Iiboshi,Tatsuyoshi Matsumae
and Shin-Ichi Nishiyama
Abstract
We incorporate two structural shocks associated with balance sheets of both the
financial and nonfinancial firms in a medium scale New Keynesian dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The structural shocks in the model are
assumed to possess stochastic volatilities with a leverage effect. Then, we estimated
the model using a data-rich estimation method and utilized up to 40 macroeco-
nomic time series. We found the following three pieces of empirical evidence in the
Great Recession (Dec. 2007–Jun. 2009) worsened further by the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008. First, the net-worth shock of financial firms had
gradually declined prior to a huge decrease of net-worth of nonfinancial firms.
Second, the net worth shock of nonfinancial firms accounted for large weight of the
business cycles after the Great Recession, in terms of the data-rich approach with
the SV of structural shocks, unlike the standard DSGE model. Third, the Troubled
Asset Relief Program would have immediately worked to improve balance sheets of
financial institutions, although it would not have stopped worsening those of the
corporate sector for a while.
Keywords: new Keynesian model, DSGE model, data-rich approach,
Bayesian estimation, financial friction, stochastic volatility, net-worth shock
1. Introduction
The Great Recession (Dec. 2007–Jun. 2009) is thought to have deeply worsened
by simultaneous collapse of several big financial institutions besides many bank-
rupts of the corporate firms and households in the US economy. Recently, a couple
of survey papers researching causes of the Great Recession by prominent econo-
mists (i.e., Gertler and Gilchrist [1], Kehoe et al. [2]) are published in terms of
macroeconomic models, say dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models. Since we obtained a broad consensus that solvency and liquidity problems
of the financial institutions are chief among the fundamental factors causing the
recession itself, as described in above papers, it is plausible to incorporate financial
frictions in both the banking and the corporate sectors of a New Keynesian (NK)
DSGE model in order to analyze the recession. Meanwhile, Mian and Sufi [3]
analyzed the Great Recession from the aspect of household balance sheets and
employment.
The purpose of this study is to identify what structural exogenous shocks
contributed to the Great Recession by analyzing the mutual relationship among
macroeconomic and financial endogenous variables in terms of business cycles from
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the point of view of a DSGE model. In fact, according to Ireland [4], there are three
sets of considerations that are premature for existing DSGE models. First, failures of
financial institutions and liquidity drain should be endogenously described with
other fundamental macroeconomic variables for producing economic insights. Sec-
ond, most recessions have been associated with a rise in bankruptcies among bank-
ing and corporate sectors alike. And recessions have featured systematic problems
in the banking and loan industry. And third, declines in housing prices and prob-
lems in the credit markets might have played an independent and causal role in the
Great Recession’s severity. Our study challenges to struggle with the former two
exercises of Ireland [4], by identifying two different unobservable net-worth
shocks of both banking and corporate sectors in a medium scale NK-DSGE model,
into which two different financial frictions are newly embedded. And, we estimate
time-varying volatility of these structural shocks in order to examine rapid changes
of uncertainty and risk for financial crisis across financial markets and the economy
as a whole.
As advanced econometric tool, we adopt a data-rich environment to estimate a
NK DSGE model following Smets and Wouters [5, 6] but adding above two finan-
cial frictions for the US economy. The advantage of incorporating a data-rich
environment into a NK DSGE model is that we can more robustly identify two
different net-worth shocks generated by two financial frictions because of
decomposing comovements of model variables and idiosyncrasy of measurement
errors from observable variables of big macroeconomic panel dataset. And this
advantage is also useful to estimate a time-varying stochastic volatilities (SVs) of
the structural shocks including financial shocks in the DSGE model and to estimate
contributions of financial frictions on the real economy both during the Great
Recession and after it, because this framework allows the structural shocks to relax
the specifications thanks to big dataset.
By adopting the data-rich environment and SV shocks, we will consider four
alternative cases, based on the number of observation variables (11 vs. 40 observ-
able variables) and the specification of the volatilities of the structural shocks
(constant volatility vs. time-varying volatility). By comparing the four cases, we
report the following three findings of empirical evidence in the Great Recession: (1)
the net-worth shock of financial institution had gradually declined prior to a huge
decrease of net-worth of corporate sector. (2) The net worth shock of nonfinancial
firms played an important role during the Great Recession and after it, in terms of
the data-rich NK DSGE model with the SV of structural shocks, unlike the standard
NK DSGE model. (3) The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) would have
immediately worked to improve balance sheets of financial institutions, although it
would not have stopped worsening those of the corporate sector for a while. These
findings suggest that it is effective to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk
management of banks for preventing financial crisis. And they seem to support the
Basel III framework developed by the Basel Committee in response to the global
financial crisis of 2007–2009.
As describing our estimation results, introducing structural SV shocks to a DSGE
model has their credible interval narrower than half of the model with constant
volatilities that indicates a realistic assumption of the time-varying structural
shocks. And it is plausible that the uncertainty is trivial in ordinary times but it
becomes to a huge size at the turning points of recessions.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates two financial frictions of
the New Keynesian model. Section 3 presents the estimation technique and data
description. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the estimation results and interpretation of
the Great Recession in terms of the New Keynesian model. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2
Financial Crises
2. Model
We adopt the stylized DSGE model, often referred to as the medium-scale New
Keynesian (NK) model, following Christiano et al. [7] and Smets and Wouters
[5, 6], which focused on the nominal rigidities of price level and wage as well as the
quadratic adjustment cost of investment and habit formation of consumption as
blue arrows shown in Figure 1(a). In this NK model, it is generally assumed that
Figure 1.
Our NK model. (a) Flowchart of economy. (b) Two financial frictions. Notes: Panel (a) shows the medium-
scale NK model, following Christiano et al. [7] and Smets and Wouters [5, 6], which assume the nominal
rigidities of price level and wage as well as the quadratic adjustment cost of investment and habit formation of
consumption. Panel (b) shows two financial frictions in which the spread between lending rate REt and deposit
rate Rt is divided into two portions by introducing the risk-adjusted return for banks R
F
t in between, and which
are modeled to reflect the two different relationship between the balance sheets of the corporate and banking
sectors and the borrowers’ agency costs against the lenders, respectively.
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there are six structural shocks, i.e., (1) preference shock, (2) labor supply shock in
households, (3) total factor productivity (TFP) shock, (4) investment-specific
technology shock in production function, (5) monetary policy shock and (6) gov-
ernment spending shock in the policy and government sectors.
And, shown as two red arrows in Figure 1(a), we additionally incorporate two
different financial frictions in our NKmodel, since banks have two roles in generating
two agency costs with asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. One
is as the lenders to the corporate sector and the other is as the borrowers from
depositors. These two financial frictions are designed to reflect the two different
relationship between the balance sheets of the corporate and banking sectors and the
borrowers’ agency costs against the lenders, respectively. The former friction
between the bank and the corporate sectors was developed by Bernanke et al. [8], and
estimated by Christensen and Dib [9] and Christiano et al. [10]. The latter friction
between banks and depositors was proposed by Gertler and Karadi [11] and Gertler
and Kiyotaki [12]. Recently, comparisons of both frictions have been studied by Villa
[13] and Rannenberg [14] etc. Brumermeier et al. [15] summarized the recent devel-
opment of these financial friction models of macroeconomics.
In our NK model with the financial frictions, the spread between lending rate REt
and deposit rate Rt is divided into two portions by introducing the risk-adjusted
return for banks RFt in between, as shown in Figure 1(b). The positive corporate
net-worth shock shrinks the difference between REt and R
F
t by enlarging the liability
of the corporate sector, while the positive bank’s net-worth shock shortens the
difference between RFt and Rt by expanding the liability of the bank sector. Most of
DSGE studies adopt independent assumptions of structural shocks, since they are
set up originally but not accessional from others and the relaxation of this assump-
tion is involved in difficulty to identify shocks. Following them, it is plausible to
assume that these two shocks are independent from one other, since our purpose is
to identify different impacts of balance sheet channels of financial and nonfinancial
firms on the recessions by measuring sizes of the both financial frictions through
the both net-worth shocks of the balance sheets in the these firms.
Decomposing the effects of the two financial frictions on macroeconomic fluc-
tuations might be important for finding out the origin of the Great Recession as well
as measuring the degree of damage to the US economy. More detail explanation of
this model is described in Iiboshi et al. [16].
3. Estimation methods and data
3.1 Econometric methods
To estimate our NK DSGE model, we adopt two econometric approaches. One is
the data-rich approach proposed by Boivin and Giannoni [17], whose method
followed by Shorfheide et al. [18], Nishiyama et al. [19] and Iiboshi et al. [20]. The
other is to incorporate SV structural shocks in the DSGE model that was proposed
by Justiniano and Primiceri [21]. They focused on the Great Moderation using a NK
DSGE model with structural shocks with SV framework.
This econometric framework such as the data-rich approach with SV structural
shocks can be described as
Xt ¼ ΛSt þ et, (1)
St ¼ Γ θð ÞSt1 þ εt, εt  N 0, σ
2
t
 
, (2)
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log σ2t ¼ μþ ϕ log σ
2
t1 þ ηt, ηt∽N 0, 1ð Þ, (3)
where Xt and St are vectors of observable and model variables, respectively. εt is
a vector of structural shocks. σ2t is time-varying variance following autoregressive
process such as the third equation, say the SV model. In the framework of the data-
rich environment, we make one to many matching relation between St and Xt,
whereas a standard DSGE model takes one to one matching between them, as
shown in Figure 2.
3.2 Setting of four cases
Based on above econometric framework, we consider four alternative cases
based on the specification of the volatilities of the structural shocks, σ2t , (constant
vs. time-varying volatility) and on the number of observation variables, Xt, (11 vs.
40 observable variables) as summarized in Table 1. The first case (referred to as
Case A) dealt with one of the standard DSGE models that used 11 observable vari-
ables in the measurement equation and the structural shocks with i.i.d. Normal
distribution in the transition equation. The second case (Case B) was extended to
SV shocks from Case A. The third case (Case C) extends to the data-rich approach
Figure 2.
Data-rich approach. Notes: In the data-rich environment (right panel), we make one to many matching
relation between model variables and observations. And in a standard DSGE model (left panel), we take one to
one matching relation between them.
Case A Case B Case C Case D
Types of econometrics framework Standard
DSGE
Standard
DSGE
Data-rich
DSGE
Data-rich
DSGE
Num. of Obs. 11 11 40 40
Matching between
Model Variables and Obs.
1 to 1 1 to 1 1 to 4 1 to 4
Types of Struct. Shocks iid normal SV iid normal SV
Notes: The second row denotes types of econometrics framework as shown in Figure 2. The third and fourth rows stand for number of
observations for estimation and relation between model variables and observations, respectively. The fifth row represents type of
distribution of independent structural shocks. Abbreviation “iid” and “SV” denotes identical and independent distribution and stochastic
volatilities, respectively.
For the third row, contents of the observations are described in table of Appendix. 11 observations of Cases A and B are in the first 11 rows
of this table, while 40 observations of Cases C and D are all of the table including remains.
For the forth row, “1 to 4” denotes matching one model variables with four observations. A model variable which each observation
belongs to is described in the second column of the table.
Table 1.
Setting of four cases.
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with i.i.d shocks, including 40 observable variables, which indicate more or less
four observable variables corresponding to one specified model variable. And the
fourth case (Case D) extends to the data-rich approach with SV shocks from
Case C.
3.3 Data description
By adopting the data-rich approach, we can adopt a relatively large and quar-
terly panel dataset with 40 observable variables. (More detail explanation of the
observations is in the section, Appendix, in the end of the chapter.) In order to
focus on the period of Great Moderation after 1984, we estimate between 1985:Q2
and 2012:Q2 including the Great Recession (Dec. 2007–Jun. 2009) and after it, since
avoiding the period of the instable monetary policy regime, especially around the
end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, say Hyper Inflation, directed by chairmen of
the FRB, P. Volcker and A. Greenspan.
The contents of 40 observations are described in Appendix in the end of this
chapter. Here, we mention about how to assort them based on the four cases. In
Cases A and B, we looked at the following 11 series: (1) output, (2) consumption,
(3) investment, (4) inflation, (5) real wage, (6) labor input, (7) the nominal interest
rate, (8) the nominal corporate borrowing rate, (9) the external finance premium,
(10) the corporate leverage ratio, and (11) the bank leverage ratio. The first seven
series are following Smets and Wouters [5, 6]. The four remaining financial
observable variables were selected for matching the model variables corresponding
to the two financial frictions. The entrepreneur’s nominal borrowing rate is the yield
on Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bonds detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Figure 3.
Observed financial data for identifying two financial shocks. (a) External finance premium. (b) Corporate
leverage ratio. (c) Bank leverage ratio. (d) Borrowing rate. Notes: Four panels show 11 series involved in both
the financial and nonfinancial sectors corresponding to the four model variables of the two financial frictions,
respectively. These observations are used to identify the two financial shocks. For more detail description, see
Appendix in the end of chapter.
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To measure the external finance premium, we employed the charge-off rates for all
banks’ credits and issuer loans, measured as an annualized percentage of
uncollectible loans. The two leverage ratios were calculated as their total asset
divided by their net worth, respectively.
In Cases C and D, to activate the data rich environment, we populate an addi-
tional 29 series composed of 18 series of key macroeconomics and 11 series of the
banking sector into the existing 11 series in Cases A and B. In Figure 3(a), three
different loan charge-off rates based on different institutions are selected as exter-
nal finance premium. And Panel (c), we take the inverse of the commonly-used
ratio, i.e., bank asset over bank equity as the leverage ratio. As shown in this figure,
we can find comovements of 11 observations among four kinds of model variables
related to the banking sector. In the data rich framework, these comovements are
made full use as the model variables, and idiosyncrasy of an observation apart from
its comovement is turned out as its measurement error in a DSGE model.
4. Empirical results
Before discussing and remaking the source of Great Recession, we firstly report
estimation results, especially focusing on estimations of eight structural shocks by
smoothing technique and historical decompositions of four key model variables, (a)
output, (b) investment, (c) bank leverage ratio, and (d) borrowing rate, based on
the four cases. Those estimations must be significant clue for figuring it out.
4.1 Structural shocks and their volatilities
In Cases A and B estimating standard data structure with the 11 observable
variables, the posterior mean (deep blue solid lines) and a 90% credible band
(a light blue shade) of the eight structural shocks with constant and time-varying
volatilities are drawn in Figure 4(a) and (b), respectively. And, Figure 5(a) and (b)
show those of the data rich structure with the 40 observable variables, say Cases C
and D, respectively. By comparing estimations of the eight structural shocks of
different cases, we observe the following two points. First, although a couple of
estimated shocks such as TFP and monetary policy shocks looks very similar among
four cases, others, especially labor supply and government spending shocks, have
different shapes among the four cases despite using the same DSGE model. Second,
every structural shocks with stochastic volatilities (Case B and D) become more
volatile in recessions, i.e., 1990:Q2 through 91:Q1, 2001:Q2 through 01:Q3, 2007:Q4
through 08:Q2, and more stable in remaining periods than their counterparts (Case
A and C), without regard to data structure used.
Next we consider about financial and nonfinancial net-worth shocks affected
on balance sheets on both sectors as shown in the second and third row of
Figures 4 and 5, respectively. Firstly, we can see deep trough at 2008:Q3 in the
banking net-worth shocks (the third row) of all cases in these fours figures. In fact,
in September and October 2008, major financial institutions such as Lehman
Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Washington Mutual, Wachovia,
Citi group, and AIG either failed, were acquired under duress, or were subject to
government takeover. On the other hand, the huge troughs of the corporate net-
worth shock might not coincide in all cases, and seem to split to two different
periods, 2009:Q1 in constant volatility cases (Cases A and C), and 2009:Q2 in
stochastic volatilities cases (Cases B and D). However it is worthy of notice that in
every case, the corporate net-worth shocks have arrived at deep troughs after the
banking sector shocks have experienced its huge drop.
7
Source of the Great Recession
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90729
In order to measure the accuracy of the eight estimated shocks, we calculate
an average range of 90% credible interval across all of the sample period as
Figures 4 and 5. When the average of 90% interval of a shock of one case become
smaller than those of another case, then we can regard that the shock of the case is
more precisely identified than another case. Although we leave out the explanation
of detail values, averages of five shocks, say (1) preference, (2) banking net worth,
(3) labor supply, (4) government spending, and (5) monetary policy, are less in
stochastic volatilities cases, B and D, than constant volatilities cases, A and C. In
Cases B and D, the averages in the former three shocks are around half against those
in Cases A and C. Furthermore, average of government spending shocks downscales
by one eighth to one tenth. From these results, we infer that the time-varying
volatilities of shocks might be more fit to data generation process which we cannot
Figure 4.
Structural shocks of standard data structure. (a) Constant volatility: Case A. (b) Stochastic volatility: Case B.
Notes: Case A and Case B are described in Table 1. Eight shocks in our DSGE model are explained in Section 2.
Corporate Net Worth shock and Bank Net Worth are balance sheet shocks of nonfinancial and financial sectors
described in Figure 1(b). TFP (total factor productivity), investment specific technology, and labor shock are
belong to supply shocks, whereas preference of consumers, monetary policy, and government spending shocks
belong to demand shocks. The deep blue lines and blue shaded area are posterior mean and 90% credible
interval of structural shocks in Cases A and B, respectively.
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observe. In addition, we expect that the SV shocks are likely to match for a rapid
change of uncertainty and volatilities at the turning points of the Great Recession,
rather than the constant volatilities cases, as shown later.
Figure 6 shows the posterior means (deep blue lines) and 90% interval (light
blue shade area) of the SVs of all eight shocks for standard data structure (Cases B)
and data rich structure (Case D), as well as the posterior means of constant volatil-
ities of the shocks (red dashed flat lines) in Case A and C. As these graphs, in
ordinary period, say before the recession, a large part of the deep blue lines (Cases B
and D) is under the red dashed lines (Cases A and C). Smoothing SVs of the six
Figure 5.
Structural shocks of data rich environment. (a) Constant volatility: Case C. (b) Stochastic volatility: Case D.
Notes: Case C and Case D are described in Table 1. Eight shocks in our DSGE model are explained in Section
2. Corporate Net Worth shock and Bank Net Worth are balance sheet shocks of nonfinancial and financial
sectors described in Figure 1(b). TFP (total factor productivity), investment specific technology, and labor
shock are belong to supply shocks, whereas preference of consumers, monetary policy, and government spending
shocks belong to demand shocks. The deep blue lines and blue shaded area are posterior mean and 90% credible
interval of structural shocks in Case C and D.
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shocks, but investment-specific technology (IST) shock and the labor supply
shocks, look very similar in Cases B and D. And the SVs of the preference and labor
supply shocks fluctuate with large amplitude during the period of the expansion
between 2001:Q4 and 2007:Q4, and it indicates that they have played an important
role of boom. Meanwhile, the SVs of the remaining shocks seem to be quiet and
level off between 1990:Q1 and 2007:Q3. After August 2007, when the Great Reces-
sion began with the seizure in the banking system (in fact, BNP Paribas precipitated
ceasing investment activity and was followed by three big hedge funds that
Figure 6.
Stochastic volatilities of structural shocks. (a) Stochastic volatility: Case B. (b) Stochastic volatility data rich:
Case D. Notes: Case B and Case D are described in Table 1. Eight shocks in our DSGE model are explained in
Section 2. Corporate Net Worth shock and Bank Net Worth are balance sheet shocks of nonfinancial and
financial sectors described in Figure 1(b). TFP (total factor productivity), investment specific technology, and
labor shock are belong to supply shocks, whereas preference of consumers, monetary policy, and government
spending shocks belong to demand shocks. The deep blue lines and blue shaded area are posterior mean and 90%
credible interval of stochastic volatility (SV) of Cases B and D, respectively. The red dashed lines denote the
posterior means of constant volatilities shocks estimated in Case A and C, respectively. SV shocks are explained
in Section 3.
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specialized in US mortgage debt at this moment.), the SVs of net-worth shocks of
financial and nonfinancial sectors have rapidly jumped to ceil for both of Case B and
D, as well as other shocks such as TFP, monetary policy, IST and labor supply
shocks. And levels of these SVs (deep blue lines) exceed the red dashed flat lines
indicating estimation of constant volatilities as Figure 6.
In this study, we would like to verify whether the data-rich approach contributes
to the accuracy of the estimated SVs, compared with standard data structure.
Figures 4(b) and 5(b) show averages of the 90% interval (light shade area) in
Cases B does not look different from those of Case D. And, although Figure 6
reports difference in sizes of the 90% intervals (light shade area) of the SVs over the
entire sample period between Cases B and D, we do not find obvious improvement
of 90% band by the data-rich approach in Case D. From only the three figures, we
cannot yet include the data-rich environment improve the accuracy of the SVs
estimates. This inquiry will be remained until further research.
Figure 7.
Historical decomposition of output. (a) Constant volatility Case A. (b) Stochastic volatility Case B. (c)
Constant volatility data rich Case C. (d) Stochastic volatility data rich Case D. Notes: Four Cases A, B, C and
D are described in Table 1. Case A; 11 observable variables and constant volatility shocks. Case B: 11
observable variables and structural shocks with SV. Case C: 40 observable variables and constant volatility
shocks. Case D: 40 observable variables and structural shocks with SVs. Eight shocks are explained in Section 2
and SV shocks are explained in Section 3.
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Finally, we turn to analyzing the monetary policy in the Great Recession and
after it including an unconventional monetary policy by FRB such as Round 1 of
quantitative easing policy (QE1), between 2008:Q4 and 2010:Q2 and Round 2 of
quantitative easing policy (QE2) between 2010:Q4 and 2011:Q2, although our
monetary policy rule follows linearized Taylor rules. As the fourth row of
Figures 4 and 5, we can find the estimation of monetary policy shocks (deep blue
lines) have two big negative troughs in this period for all cases. The first negative
trough was identified at 2007:Q4 when the global financial market was disarranged
by announcement of the BNP Paribas. And the second trough was ascertained at
2008:Q3, immediately before the FRB implemented QE1. Especially, the sizes of the
two big negative shocks are classified in the Cases B and D with SVs shocks, as
shown in Figures 4(b) and 5(b). The fourth row of Figure 6 also draws the rapid
surge of these volatilities of monetary policy shocks between 2007:Q4 and 2008:Q3.
In other words, the two unconventional monetary policy might be undertaken more
boldly and without hesitation as well as the case of conventional tightening policy
according to the 90% credible band of the SVs.
Figure 8.
Historical decomposition of investment. (a) Constant volatility Case A. (b) Stochastic volatility Case B. (c)
Constant volatility data rich Case C. (d) Stochastic volatility data rich Case D. Notes: See the notes of Figure 7.
12
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4.2 Historical decompositions
Here, we move to discuss about difference of historical decompositions among
the four cases. In particular, as can be seen from Figures 7(a)–(d)–10(a)–(d), we
focus on the periods between 2000:Q1 and 2012:Q2 of the following four observa-
tions and model variables, say (1) the real GDP of observations matching to an
output gap of model variable, similarly (2) the gross private domestic investment
matching to investment, (3) Moody’s bond index (corporate Baa) matching to
corporate borrowing rate, (4) the commercial banks’ leverage ratio matching to the
bank leverage ratio. The red and black circle lines represent observations and
smoothed estimation, respectively. The differences between both lines indicate
measurement errors of observations. In these figures, the light blue shade repre-
sents the period of the Great Recession (2007:Q3 to 2009:Q2). In order to make
more visible and to concentrate on the contributions of both net-worth shocks of
banking sector (deep blue shade area) and corporate sector (green shade area) for
the recession by remaining key shocks like the TFP (red shade area) and monetary
Figure 9.
Historical decomposition of borrowing rate. (a) Constant volatility Case A. (b) Stochastic volatility Case B. (c)
Constant volatility data rich Case C. (d) Stochastic volatility data rich Case D. Notes: See the notes of Figure 7.
13
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policy shocks (yellow shade area), we gathered the other four miscellaneous shocks
as one bundle (light blue shade area) in these figures.
We start to discuss about real activities, say the real GDP and the gross private
domestic investment. As shown in Figures 7 and 8, the contributions by each shocks
show similar proportions between the real GDP and the investment. The decomposi-
tion by each shock has the same sign at every period of both variables in all four cases,
but the sizes of the contribution of shocks are quite different depending on the cases.
For example, the TFP shock (red shade area) accounted for a large portion of the
sources of the Great Recession, whereas the bank net-worth (deep blue shade area)
explained a small part of drops in Cases A and B. And the positive corporate net-worth
(green shade area) increased and contributed to raising these variables by a significant
portion during the recession in Case A. Meanwhile, Cases C and D showed that the
positive impact by the corporate net-worth shock (green shade area) was smaller than
Case A, and that the bank net-worth shock (deep blue shade area) explain a half of the
downturn of both variables in the recession as well as the TFP shock.
Figure 9 draws historical decomposition of a model variable of corporate bor-
rowing rate using an observation of Moody’s bond index (corporate Baa). For all
Figure 10.
Historical decomposition of bank leverage ratio. (a) Constant volatility Case A. (b) Stochastic volatility Case B. (c)
Constant Volatility Data Rich Case C. (d) Stochastic Volatility Data Rich Case D. Notes: See the notes of Figure 7.
14
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cases, a sharp spike of the rate must be mainly contributed for the negative shock of
bank net-worth (deep blue shade area) as well as from a drop of the TFP shock (red
shade area), while the positive shock of corporate net-worth (green shade area) are
likely to account for extending of the rate downward in the recession. On the other
hand, TARP might have been effectively workable and made the net-worth of
financial firms become positive, that would have contributed to decline of the
borrowing rate after 2010:Q1. Especially, these findings are seen in Cases B and D
with SV shock.
Figure 10 shows the decomposition of the commercial banks’ leverage ratio, i.e.,
the ratio of the bank’s asset to the bank’s net-worth for all four cases. The leverage
ratio fluctuates countercyclical as these figures. In the recession, two negative net-
worth shocks of both sectors worsen balance sheet of banking sectors indicating
sharp spike of the ratio. But, immediately after starting TARP, bank equity was
likely to successfully improve, although the net-worth shock in corporate sector
(green shade area) continued negatively and made the corporate balance sheet
much worse even during executing TARP in 2010. And the banking loan to corpo-
rate sector declined sharply by large deficit of corporate balance sheet. A reduction
of banking loan would have brought the banks’ leverage ratio to decrease during
implement of TARP, because the numerator of the ratio means total of loan and
equity in the banks. In fact, we often observe that banking loan declines but
corporate bond increases in the recession. However, the countercyclical movement
of the bank’s leverage ratio was not generated from the banking model by Gertler
and Kiyotaki [12] which is one of our financial frictions of banking sector. On the
other hand, Adrian et al. [22] intended to describe the reason why the ratio was
countercyclical, using a theory of liquidity and leverage proposed by Adrian and
Shin [23]. Our findings about two conflicting net-worth shocks in the recession
seem to be consistent with Adrian et al.’s [22] findings.
5. Discussion and remark
Through estimation of our model, we found three key findings during the period
of the Great Recession and after it, which has already described in the previous
section. Without hesitating duplication, we summarize these points.
First, as can be seen from Figures 4 and 5, the timing of the two different
financial shocks modeling as balance sheet shocks in financial and nonfinancial
firms have not arisen simultaneously, but the bank’s balance sheet shock has sharply
rose prior to the surge of the corporate balance sheet shock. When a financial crisis
brings blooming degeneration of both balance sheet, this timing pattern (not con-
current, but sequential timing) must be noted as a lead of endogenous relationship
of the balance sheet conditions in both banking sector and the corporate sector. Our
model, however, has limitations. That is, we assume the two balance sheet shocks to
be independent from each other and further do not allow the corporate sector to
keep the bank’s equity as an asset of his balance sheet. Thus, it may be inappropriate
to interpret the endogenous relationship between the two net-worth shocks. Yet, it
is worth noting about remark of the timing pattern of the two financial shocks
during the Great Recession.
Second, we found that during the Great Recession, contributions of corporate
balance sheet shock are relatively smaller in models with constant volatility shocks
as Cases A and C than in models with SV shocks as Cases B and D as shown in
Figures 7–10. This result suggests that estimation without the data-rich environ-
ment is likely to under-evaluate importance of the corporate balance sheet shock.
Furthermore, an accuracy of estimating the corporate balance sheet shocks during
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the Great Recession play an important role of accounting for the economic recovery
of the U.S. economy. For instance, in cases with constant volatility shocks as Cases
A and C, a slow recovery of output is mainly explained by the negative TFP shock.
On the other hand, in cases with SV shocks as Cases B and D, it is mainly explained
by a prolonged negative corporate balance sheet shock. The slow recovery of the
U.S. economy after the Great Recession remains as an important question, and
a persuasive description of this question requests a precise estimation of trace of
these shocks. To this end, especially for estimating the corporate net worth shock,
we hope that a data-rich approach with SV shocks must be more reliable than
standard data structure.
Third, there is another important finding from the historical decomposition
which is the behavior of the bank’s balance sheet shock. A sharp decline of the
bank’s balance sheet shock was obviously associated with the Great Recession, and
rapid reductions of output and investment have stem from two net-worth shocks,
as shown in Figures 7 and 8. Immediately after end of the Great Recession, the
bank’s balance sheet shock, however, quickly reversed its direction from negative to
positive, and picked up both of output and investment upward. When we consider
the timing of this reversal, it was plausible that the execution of the TARP is behind
this counterturn. That is, TARP would have successfully made downward trend of
the bank’s balance sheet change upward. From our finding about the positive con-
tribution of the bank’s net-worth shock to the real GDP and investment right after
the end of the Great Recession period, the executing TARP might be one of the
major factors behind the stopping further degeneration of the recession and con-
tributing to the recovery of the U.S. economy.
These three findings seem to support the Basel III framework developed by the Basel
Committee in response to the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. The Basel III revised
in order to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of banks, by
reducing excessive variability of risk-weighted assets (RWA) of banks. In particular,
for preventing global financial crisis, it might be effective to restore credibility of the
RWA by complementing the risk-weighted capital ratio with a finalized leverage ratio
and a revised and robust capital floor, according to our empirical findings.
6. Conclusion
This study is to identify what structural exogenous shocks contributed to the
Great Recession and to analyze the mutual relationship among macroeconomic and
financial endogenous variables in terms of a medium scale New Keynesian DSGE
model with two net-worth shocks in both the financial and nonfinancial firms,
using data rich approach with as many as 40 observations. And it is plausible to
incorporate two different financial frictions to a standard DSGE model to analyze
the recession, since there was a broad consensus that solvency and liquidity prob-
lems of the major financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch,
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Citi group, and AIG,
which either failed, were acquired under duress, or were subject to government
takeover, might be attributed causing the Great Recession itself.
We considered four alternative cases based on the number of observation vari-
ables (11 vs. 40 variables) and the specification of the volatilities of the structural
shocks (constant volatility vs. time-varying-volatility). Comparing these four cases,
we suggested the following two pieces of empirical evidence in the Great Recession;
(1) the negative bank net worth shock gradually spread before the corporate net
worth shock burst, and (2) the data-rich approach and the structural shocks with SV
evaluated the contribution of the corporate net worth shock to a substantial portion
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of the macroeconomic fluctuations after the Great Recession, in contrast to a stan-
dard DSGE model.
From a view of evaluating policies, the implementation of TARP has sufficiently
worked to mitigate the bank’s negative net-worth shocks und upturned the output
and the investment. The model and empirical results in this study suggest that such
a bail-out program must be workable effectively in case of a serious recession
followed by a financial crisis with failures of financial institutions. On the other
hand, the slow recovery of the U.S. economy after the Great Recession can be
explained by the wounded balance sheet of the non-financial corporate sector,
which is not healed in a short period.
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Appendix
No. Variables Proc. Observation explanation Unit of data Source
Case A and Case B: The standard Data Structure
1 R 6 Interest rate: Federal Funds Effective Rate % per annum FRB
2 Y1 5 Real gross domestic product (excluding net
export)
Billion of chained
2000
BEA
3 C1 5* Gross personal consumption expenditures Billion dollars BEA
4 I1 5* Gross private domestic investment - Fixed
investment
Billion dollars BEA
5 pi1 8 Price deflator: Gross domestic product 2005Q1 = 100 BEA
6 w1 2 Real Wage (Smets and Wouters, 2007) 1992Q3 = 0 SW
(2007)
7 L1 1 Hours Worked (Smets and Wouters, 2007) 1992Q3 = 0 SW
(2007)
8 RE1 6 Moody’s bond indices - corporate Baa % per annum Bloomberg
9 LevF1 7 Commercial banks leverage ratio Total asset/net
worth ratio
FRB
10 LevE1 3 Nonfarm non-fin. Corp. business leverage
ratio
Total asset/net
worth ratio
FRB
11 s1 1 Charge-off rates for all banks credit and
issuer loans
% per annum FRB
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No. Variables Proc. Observation explanation Unit of data Source
Case C and Case D: The data-Rich Environment
12 Y2 4 Industrial production index: final products Index 2007 = 100 FRB
13 Y3 4 Industrial production index: total index Index 2007 = 100 FRB
14 Y4 4 Industrial production index: products Index 2007 = 100 FRB
15 C2 5* PCE excluding food and energy Billions of dollars BEA
16 C3 5 Real PCE, quality indexes; non-durable
goods
Index 2005 = 100 BEA
17 C4 5 Real PCE, quality indexes; services Index 2005 = 100 BEA
18 I2 5 Real gross private domestic investment Billions of
Chained 2005
BEA
19 I3 5* Gross private domestic investment: fixed
nonresidential
Billions of dollars BEA
20 I4 5 Manufactures’ new orders: non-defense
capital goods
Millions of dollars DOC
21 pi2 8 Core CPI excluding food and energy Index 2005 = 100 BEA
22 pi3 8 Price index - PCE excluding food and
energy
Index 2005 = 100 BEA
23 pi4 8 Price index - PCE - Service Index 2005 = 100 BEA
24 w2 4* Average hourly earnings: manufacturing Dollars BLS
25 w3 4* Average hourly earnings: construction Dollars BLS
26 w4 4* Average hourly earnings: service Dollars BLS
27 L2 4 Civilian Labor Force: Employed Total Thous. BLS
28 L3 4 Employees, nonfarm: total private Thous. BLS
29 L4 4 Employees, nonfarm: goods-producing Thous. BLS
30 RE2 6 Bond yield: Moody’s Baa industrial % per annum Bloomberg
31 RE3 6 Bond yield: Moody’s A corporate % per annum Bloomberg
32 RE4 6 Bond yield: Moody’s A industrial % per annum Bloomberg
33 LevF2 9 Core capital leverage ratio PCA all insured
institutions
Core capital/total
asset
FDIC
34 LevF3 7 Domestically chartered commercial banks
leverage ratio
Total asset/net
worth
FRB
35 LevF4 7 Brokers and dealers leverage ratio Total asset/net
worth
FOF
36 LevE2 3 Nonfarm nonfinancial non-corporate
leverage ratio
Total asset/net
worth
FOF
37 LevE3 3 Nonfarm corporate leverage ratio Total asset/net
worth
FRB
38 s2 1 Charge-off rate on all loans and leases all
commercial banks
% per annum FRB
39 s3 1 Charge-off rate on all loans all commercial
banks
% per annum FRB
40 s4 1 Charge-off rate on all loans banks 1st to
100th largest by assets
% per annum FRB
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Transformation Procedures, numbers stand for 1: Demeaned, 2: Linear and De-trended, 3: Logarithm and Demeaned,
4: Logarithm, Linear De-trended, and Multiplied by 100, 5: Logarithm per Capita, Linear De-trended and
Multiplied by 100, 6: De-trended using Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, 7: Logarithm, De-trended using HP Filter, and
Multiplied by 100, 8: First Difference Logarithm, De-trended using HP Filter, and Multiplied by 400, 9: the
Reciprocal number, Logarithm, De-trended using HP Filter, and Multiplied 100.
A * indicate a series that is deflated with the GDP deflator.
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